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TOKEN EXCHANGE GAMES
VIROSHAN NAICKER
Abstract. Human societies engage in a number of games which use tokens as
a means to allocate, issue and access gated resources and property rights: The
notion of exchanging tokens that represent and carry value from the past into
the future to facilitate economic exchange is a fundamental concept. As agents
exchange tokens a network structure is created in which the tokens move from
agent to agent. Agents form the vertices in the network and the exchange of
tokens creates the link structure. The rules of exchange adopted collectively
by agents shape the network structure and affect the distribution of tokens
amongst agents. Many inventions including banking, payments networks and
blockchain technology have been created for the purpose of keeping accurate
records of these implicit networks. However, our formal understanding of to-
kenised systems as large scale, iterative, interacting structures is limited. The
aim of this paper is to study the dynamics of token exchanges as a game, and
introduce a mathematical framework for understanding ledgers as complex
networks.
1. Introduction
Tokens that carry information play a fundamental role in how societies allocate,
issue and access gated resources and property rights: Tokens act as records which
facilitate the rapid exchange of rights from agent to agent in an economy. Further,
tokens carry value from the past to the future and create complex large scale in-
teracting systems: As tokens move between economic agents, an evolving network
structure is created in which agents form the nodes of the network and the pairwise
exchange of tokens form the edges of the network. Ledgers, in all their forms: from
ancient tax logbooks to blockchains, have been used throughout history to keep
track of the distribution of tokens in these types of network games. Moreover, our
information rich, connected, world offers opportunities for near instant exchange
across multiple token types. However, despite our widespread use of tokens, our
formal understanding of tokenized systems as large scale, iterative, interacting net-
works is limited.
This problem may be posed abstractly: Given a set of identical tokens that are
allocated to agents and a system of rules for how these tokens are allowed to move
between agents, how will the rules influence the distribution of tokens after many
rounds of exchanges? And, given multiple, distinct, sets of tokens that are allocated
to agents and a system of rules for determining exchanges between these distinct
sets of tokens, how will the rules influence the distribution of tokens across different
token types after many rounds of exchanges?
The aim of this paper is to answer the above questions in a mathematical context.
In order to do so, we use graph theory and linear algebra [1, 2, 3, 4] to define a
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2 VIROSHAN NAICKER
token exchange game as family of networks that evolve according to a discrete
parameter (Section 3). As the network evolves the token distribution, a ledger,
is updated accordingly. In order to apply the theory, we analyse games involving
single token types (Section 4) and show that the celebrated PageRank algorithm
[5] can be viewed as a token exchange game. Further, using information theory [6],
we consider the impact of network behaviour on token distributions (Section 5).
Since most games involve the exchange of tokens of different types amongst agents
and the notion of fungibility, the behaviour of exchanges across multiple networks
is considered in depth (Section 6). We develop several natural metrics related to
token velocity (Section 7). Finally, we construct examples of token exchange games
that are drawn from blockchain technology (Section 8). In particular, we consider
the Lightning Network [7] and the Circles token system [8].
2. Notation
Various pieces of notation from set theory, graph theory and linear algebra are
used throughout the paper. For clarity sake, a few of the conventions used are
highlighted below.
2.1. Set Theory. For set theory and combinatorics, we largely follow the notation
set out in [1]. The following labelling conventions hold for sets: Discrete sets of
elements are labelled using upper case Latin letters, while elements of sets are
labelled using lower case Latin letters. Families of sets (set-systems) are labelled
using calligraphic upper case letters. An index set will mean a set I = {0, 1, 2, . . . n}
which serves as a parameter space; if we say r ∈ I it simply means that the
parameter r ranges over the values in the index I.
2.2. Metric Spaces. The formal concept of distance is key to understanding a
ledger as an abstract object, so language from metric spaces will be necessary. A
detailed introduction may be found in [9, 10]. For our purposes a metric space
(M,d) is a topological space M equipped with an additional notion of distance d
between elements of M . Given elements x, y, z ∈M , d(x, y) is the distance between
x and y such that d(x, y) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if x = y, d(x, y) = d(y, x),
and d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z).
A sequence k = k1, k2, k3 . . . will be denoted k = (kn) where n is a finite or
countably infinite parameter. Similarly, an array will be denoted [knm] where n
and m are finite or countably infinite parameters.
2.3. Linear Algebra. Most of this paper draws on basic linear algebra and the
notation follows, to an extent, the notes [2]. Vectors will usually be written as
bold font Latin letters and matrices as upper case Latin letters, for example, x is a
vector and A is a matrix. If the components of a vector or matrix are emphasised
we will write x = [xi] = (x1, x2, . . . , xm)
T or A = [Aij ] where the dimensionality
depends on the underlying space and the superscript T denotes the transpose. In
order to keep track of several related matrices and vectors, a subscript notation will
be used, for example, xr ∈ Rm refers a vector with m components parametrized
by r ∈ I where I is an index set. Similarly Ars is a doubly parametrized collection
of matrices with r ∈ I and s ∈ J ; and each matrix is written in components as
Ars = [Aij ]rs. Effectively, this is a tensor with four indices but notationally it is
more useful in the following to think of it as a matrix with two parameters. A left
stochastic matrix is a matrix whose columns sum to one [11].
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2.4. Graph Theory. Notation and definitions in graph theory tend to vary quite
widely, so as a baseline we will define necessary notation in this section. General
introductions to graph theory may be found in [3, 4]. More advanced material on
random graphs and networks may be found in [12, 13, 14].
A graph G is a (usually) finite of vertices V (G) and a set of edges E(G) which
comprise pairs of vertices. We may write V (G) = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and so the vertex
vi ∈ V (G). Similarly, e = vivj ∈ E(G) is the edge between vertices vi and vj . The
total number of vertices, |V (G)|, is known as the order of G, and the total number
of edges, |E(G)|, is known as the size of G.
There are several standard classes of graphs. An undirected graph that has no
loops or multiple edges is called a simple graph or just a graph. A graph with
directed edges such that vivj 6= vjvi is called a directed graph. A graph with
directed edges that allows self-loops (edges such as vivi) is called a pseudo-graph.
In a directed graph, if the edge vivj starts at vi, then vi is called the head, and vj
is called the tail. Largely, we will work with pseudo-graphs and for brevity sake we
will refer to them as graphs. In the event that we require simple or directed graphs
this will be explicitly stated.
Vertices vi and vj are adjacent if vivj ∈ E(G). In a simple graph, the open
neighbourhood of a vertex vi is the set of vertices N(vi) such that for vj ∈ N(vi)
the edge vivj ∈ E(G). The closed neighbourhood of vi is the set N(vi) ∪ {vi} and
is denoted N [vi].
In a directed or pseudo-graph, given any vertex vi ∈ V (G), the open out-
neighbourhood of vi is denoted N(vi) and consists of vertices vj such that vivj ∈
E(G) and the edge vivj starts at vi and ends at vj and vi 6∈ N(vi). The closed
out-neighbourhood of vi is N [vi] is defined similarly but vi ∈ N [vi]. Notice that we
can partition the edge set E(G) of a directed graph and a pseudo-directed graph
using out-neighbourhoods.
The degree of a vertex is the number of edges that are incident with a vertex. In
a simple graph we refer only to the degree of the vertex. In a directed graph the
out-degree of a vertex counts the number of edges for which the vertex is the head,
and the in-degree of a vertex counts the number of edges for which the vertex is the
tail. In a pseudo-graph, a loop counts as both part of the out-degree of the vertex
and the in-degree of a vertex.
A tree is a simple or directed graph which contains no cycles. A bipartite graph
is a simple or directed graph which has partite sets X and Y , so that if both vi and
vj ∈ X or both vi and vj ∈ Y then vivj , vjvi /∈ E(G).
3. Token Exchange Games
3.1. Tokens. In order to introduce the idea of a token exchange game, we need
to be specific about what we will mean by a token and a token system. Generally,
there is a tendency to define tokens by their properties, so, for example, monetary
tokens are required to be durable, divisible, transferrable and scarce. Alternatively,
monetary tokens may be defined in terms of their fungibility with goods and ser-
vices: Money is exchangeable for ‘real objects’. A general conceptual framework
is to think of a token as an allocatable property right – a token may be allocated
to an agent participating in its native token system and, concomitantly, the rights
that are imbued to the token by the system which are active may be exercised
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by the agent who owns the token. Within this framework, we motivate the next
definitions.
Definition 3.1. Token. A token is an information record that may be stored in
an arbitrary medium. Further, identical tokens may be stored on different media.
Tokens may be allocated to agents and if the information contained in the token
allocates a right to the agent, then the agent is said to be the owner of that right
and may exercise that right. Different token-types allocate different rights to agents
and are thus distinguishable.
Definition 3.2. Token System. A token system is collection of identical tokens and
a rule set for governing token behaviour and distribution properties amongst agents
participating in the system. Further, different token-types belong to distinguishable
token systems.
In the token systems that we will examine, a basic premise is that agents have
the right of exclusive ownership and, as such, multiple agents are not allowed to
own the same token at the same time. Also, the tokens that we will deal with
will, in general, be transferrable from agent to agent. Non-transferrable tokens do
arise in practice and these are a special case of the model. Notice that with the
definitions above, an apple is as much a token as a coin used to pay for that apple.
The difference is that the information contained in a tokenised apple will degrade
after some period and coins are usually recorded on more durable media.
3.2. Ledgers. Since agents may own and transfer tokens and tokens may be im-
bued with valuable rights, the record keeping of the distribution of tokens amongst
agents in a given token system is of paramount importance. Ledgers are the means
of keeping track. There are two intuitive ways to articulate the idea of a ledger:
Firstly, a ledger can be thought of as the token system itself simply because a set of
tokens distributed amongst a collection of agents is a record of the token distribu-
tion; each agent owns some tokens and collectively they make up the distribution.
Alternatively, a ledger can be thought of as a snapshot of the token distribution at a
given point in time that is a separate information record from the tokens allocated
to agents; so a secondary record. In either case, since we take it as a given that
agents can own (and be allocated) their tokens exclusively, a ledger for us is a set
of labels with a magnitude associated to each label. More specifically, we are inter-
ested in ledgers that evolve in time: Sequences of ledgers that can be ordered, and
that track changes to the token distribution due to the behaviour of participating
agent as they make token exchanges within the constraints of the token system.
The definitions below formalise the notion of a ledger by combining a set of labels
with a surjective map to a metric space.
Definition 3.3. Ranking. Let S be a set of labels and (M,d) a metric space. If
for every s ∈ S there is a surjective mapping f : s → f(s) ∈ M and, for every
pair s, t ∈ S and a metric d on M the distance d(f(s), f(t)) < ∞, then the triple
{S, f, (M,d)} defines a ranking. More specifically, since f and d define a pairwise
distance between elements of S they may be used to order the members of S.
Next, the idea of an ranking associated to a set of labels allows the formal definition
of a ledger as a collection of pairs.
Definition 3.4. Ledger. Suppose that {S, f, (M,d)} is a ranking. A ledger L is a
collection of pairs such that {s, f(s)} ∈ L for s ∈ S.
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In practice, most ledgers use M = R as the base metric space with the metrics
d(x, y) =
√
x2 + y2 or d(x, y) = |x − y| for x, y ∈ R to give a notion of distance.
In addition, ledgers may be accompanied by a finite set of physical tokens which
represent the ledger and approximates the value recorded in the ledger. Physical
money, for example, is grainy and prices adjust to this graininess. This motivates
the definitions of a token set and a tokenised ledger.
Definition 3.5. Token Set. Let T = {t1, t2, . . . , tk} be a set of real numbers such
that ti < tj for i < j and suppose that {S, f, (R, d)} is a real valued ranking. Suppose
for every s ∈ S, coefficients mi ∈ N, and a fixed  that there exists an approximation
of f(s) in terms of T as f(s) ≈∑imiti such that |f(s)−∑imiti| ≤ t1 ≤ . Then,
T is a valid token set for the ranking {S, f, (R, d)}.
Definition 3.6. Tokenised Ledger. Suppose that {S, f, (R, d)} defines a ranking
and that L is the corresponding ledger. Let T be a valid token set for the ranking
{S, f, (R, d)}. Then, a representation of each f(s) in L using the members of T is
called a tokenisation of L and L is a tokenised ledger with respect to the set T .
A further point worth noting is that when ledgers are tokenised, then entries
in the ledger are often rounded in order to take into account the graininess of the
underlying token set. In this case, it is unnecessary to distinguish between a ledger
and its tokenisation. This is the approach that we will take for the rest of the
paper.
Definition 3.7. Ledger Sequence. Suppose that t ∈ I, where I is an index set.
A ledger sequence is a sequence of ledgers in the parameter t such that for each t
there exists a ledger Lt. Moreover, the ledgers are ordered in a sequence (Lt) =
(L0, L1, L2 . . .). If I is a finite set, then (Lt) terminates for some finite k.
Using Definitions (3.3)-(3.7) a monetary system of coins and notes, for example, is
a tokenised ledger in which the token set is made up of the coins and notes. An
agent’s balance in the ledger is represented by these denominated coins and notes
and the information record is a physical one in which agents are assigned their
money as a property right. Socially, ledgers act as a shared information record
and the tokenisation of ledgers allows for agents to rapidly alter the distribution
of values across multiple ledgers by means of exchange. In monetary economies
property rights are allocated to the tokens in a given ‘currency’ ledger, and this
ledger serves to facilitate the reallocation of property rights amongst economic
agents. This redistribution process, and the movement of tokens, induces ledger
sequences as maps in which Li 7→ Li+1 according to the ‘rules’ by which tokens are
allowed to be exchanged amongst token owners. This type of dynamic behaviour
within a formal ledger motivates the idea of a token exchange game: a game in which
agents alter the distribution of values in a ledger by exchanging tokens amongst
themselves according to the rules of the token system. In the next sections we
develop such a model using the languages of graph theory and linear algebra.
3.3. Network Representation. A natural context for modelling ledgers is as a
record of exchanges in a network. In this section, we develop notation for describ-
ing a family of dynamic ledgers as an evolving family of pseudo-graphs (directed
with loops allowed). For generality sake we introduce a two parameter family of
graphs: The first parameter r keeps track of round by round ledger evolution and
the second parameter s keeps track of different ledger labels. This is to allow us to
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consider evolving ledgers of different token types and systems with different internal
rule sets that are interacting dynamically with each other.
Definition 3.8. Two Parameter Graph Family. Let G(r, s) be a two parameter
family of graphs such that r ∈ I is a countably infinite or finite index set and s ∈ J
is a set of labels. A member graph of the family is written as Grs = (Vrs, Ers) which
has vertex set Vrs and edge set Ers. Furthermore, set |Vrs| = nrs and |Ers| = mrs.
Definition 3.9. Vertex Weighting. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with vertex set
V and edge set E. Given any subset S ⊆ V a vertex weighting of S is a map
φ : S → R≥0, such that for v ∈ S, φ(v) ∈ [0,∞) and for any subset S′ ⊆ S we have
φ(S′) =
∑
v∈S′ φ(v). Thus, φ(V ) =
∑
v∈V φ(v) and, similarly, φ(S) =
∑
v∈S φ(v)
for any subset S ⊆ V . A vertex weighting on S ⊆ V is non-trivial if and only if
φ(S) > 0.
Note that the vertex weightings we use below will always be non-trivial.
Definition 3.10. Edge Weighting. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with vertex set
V and edge set E with |V | = n. Suppose that S ⊆ V . Let F (S,N [S]) be the
set of edges that have u ∈ S as the head, and v ∈ N [S] as the tail. Suppose
f = uv ∈ F (S,N [S]). An edge weighting on F (S,N [S]) is a map ψ(S,N [S]) such
that the following conditions hold:
(i) For f ∈ F , 0 < ψ(u, v) ≤ 1 and ψ(u, v) = 0 iff f /∈ F .
(ii)
∑
f∈F (S,N [S]) ψ(u, v) = 1.
(iii) If S = {u} and v ∈ N [u], then ∑u∈V,v∈N [u] ψ(u, v) = n.
Note that it is easy to show that in Defintion (3.10) conditions (i) and (ii) imply
condition (iii), since each vertex and its closed out-neighbourhood have weight one,
and there are n vertices or, alternatively, each e ∈ E belongs to a unique N [u] for
some u ∈ V , and we sum the weights over n closed out-neighbourhoods. We have
stated it this way, since we will mainly be interested in edge weightings of vertex
neighbourhoods over the entire vertex set V .
3.4. Algebraic Representation. Definitions (3.9) and (3.10) above are readily
adapted to a linear algebraic representation. In order to move from a network
picture to a linear algebraic picture we need consider the vertices of the graph as
positions that are assigned weights and the edges as matrix entries with their edge
weightings as magnitudes. This motivates the next definitions of a vertex weighting
vector and an edge weighting matrix.
Definition 3.11. Vertex Weighting Vector. Let G = (V,E) be a graph and suppose
that V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is a labelling of the vertex set. Let φ be a vertex weighting
on V . The vertex weighting vector that corresponds to (G,φ) is given by x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
T where xi = φ(vi) for i = 1, 2, . . . n.
Definition 3.12. Edge Weighting Matrix. Let G = (V,E) be a graph and suppose
that V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is a labelling of the vertex set. Suppose that eij = vivj
where eij ∈ E. Let ψ be an edge weighting on G and let ψ(eij) = wij. Then,
0 < wij ≤ 1 if eij ∈ E and wij = 0 for eij /∈ E. Setting W = [wij ] gives the edge
weighting matrix W which has dimension n× n and is left stochastic (∑j wij = 1)
due to the properties of edge weightings.
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3.5. Token Exchange Games. Using the definitions above, we are now in the
position to present a token exchange game as an abstract model of a ledger in
which a finite number of tokens (possibly of different types) are distributed and
exchanged amongst a collection of players. We are interested in describing a ledger
sequence (Lr) where r ∈ I. The sequence keeps track of the changes in token
distribution amongst a set of players and where each player can make a limited
‘hold token’ or ‘transfer token’ decision in a given round of the game. This sets up
a framework for describing an abstract class of games in which tokens move from
agent to agent according to an arbitrary rule set without the possibility of double
spending. Moreover, the framework can be extended to consider the behaviour of
multiple interacting ledgers by introducing a second parameter s ∈ J .
Definition 3.13. Token Exchange Game. Let G(r, s) be a two parameter graph
family such that for each member graph Grs = (Vrs, Ers) a valid vertex weighting
φrs and a valid edge weighting ψrs exists for each v ∈ Vrs and e ∈ Ers. Given an
initial vertex weighting φ0s for r = 0 and for each s, a token exchange game is an
iterative game where for u ∈ Vrs and v ∈ N [u]:
(1) φ(r+1)s(u) =
∑
u∈N [v]
ψrs(v, u)φrs(v).
Alternatively, given a labelling of Vrs, a vertex weighting vector xrs and an edge
weighting matrix Wrs = [wij ]rs, a token exchange game is defined iteratively using
matrix multiplication as:
(2) x(r+1)s = Wrsxrs,
where the initial vertex weighting vector, x0s, is known at r = 0.
The equivalence of the network and matrix representations of a token exchange
game follows directly from the definition of matrix multiplication. In the network
picture, the focus is at vertex and subset level while the matrix picture gives a
view of the dynamics of the system as a whole. The rules of the token exchange
game determine the nature of Wrs and ψrs. Conditions such transaction costs
and token issuance mechanisms can be expressed as mathematical rules contained
in Wrs and ψrs that depend on r and alter the distribution of tokens iteratively
through Defintion (3.13). The next definition explains the parameter s in a token
exchange game.
Definition 3.14. Layers. Given a token exchange game each s ∈ J defines a layer
the game. We make the following distinctions between layers:
(i) A single layer token exchange game is a game in which |J | = 1 and there
is only one available token type in the game.
(ii) A multilayer token exchange game allows for |J | concurrent layers each of
which represents a unique token type.
(iii) A sublayer of a token exchange game uses a two parameter graph subfamily,
for example, F(r, s) ⊂ G(r, s) where r ∈ I∗ ⊆ I and s ∈ J∗ ⊆ J , to
construct a nested token exchange game.
Finally, we distinguish between games that are open and games that are closed
using the token supply. It is easy to see that in a given round r, for any given s,
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the token supply (of type-s tokens) is:
(3) |xrs| =
∑
i
xi =
∑
v∈Vrs
φrs(v),
using Definitions (3.9), (3.11) and (3.13). The next question is whether tokens can
be introduced into the game from an external supply or taken out of the game.
Thus, we make the distinction below.
Definition 3.15. Open and Closed Games. For a fixed s, let Trs = |xrs| be the
token supply for a token exchange game defined according to (3.13). If Trs = Ts
and remains constant for all r, then the game is called closed, otherwise the game
is called open.
In essence an open game allows for changes to the token supply during the game.
One way to get around using an open game is to assume that all the tokens that
will ever be created are held in a special treasury wallet and released to (or locked
away from) the ‘rest of the world’ for the appropriate round. However, it may be
useful to study an open game as a subset of a larger closed game, as well as allowing
tokens to be minted and destroyed. In order to model an open game another class
of vertex weightings are required, and these are constructed so that no player may
have a negative balance even after tokens are deducted by an external party.
Definition 3.16. Relative Vertex Weighting. Let G = (V,E) be a graph and
suppose that φ is a vertex weighting on V and ψ is an edge weighting on E. A
relative vertex weighting pi is a vertex weighing on V with the positivity condition
relaxed so that pi(v) ∈ [−φ(v)× ψ(v, v),∞) for any v ∈ V .
Definition 3.17. Relative Vertex Weighting Vector. Let G = (V,E) be a graph and
suppose that pi is a relative vertex weighting on V . Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. The rel-
ative vertex weighting vector corresponding to (G, pi) is given by y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn)
T
where pi(vi) = yi and i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Definition 3.18. Open Token Exchange Game. Let G(r, s) be a two parameter
graph family such that for each member graph Grs = (Vrs, Ers) a valid vertex weight-
ing φrs and a valid edge weighting ψrs exists for each v ∈ Vrs and e ∈ Ers. An open
token exchange game is a token exchange game with a relative vertex weighting pirs
on Grs where for u ∈ Vrs and v ∈ N [u]
(4) φ(r+1)s(u) = pirs(u) +
∑
u∈N [v]
ψrs(v, u)φrs(v).
Alternatively, given a labelling of Vrs, a vertex weighting vector xrs, a relative vertex
weighting vector yrs on Grs, and an edge weighting matrix Wrs = [wij ]rs an open
token exchange game is defined iteratively using matrix multiplication as:
(5) x(r+1)s = Wrsxrs + yrs.
Further, in each case, the respective initial states φ0s, pi0 and x0s, y0s are known
when r = 0.
In an open token exchange game the additional vertex weighting allows for the
creation and destruction of tokens through an external source. This can be useful,
for example, when considering token airdrop strategies. For brevity sake, in the
rest of the paper we will refer to a token exchange game as simply a game, an open
game or closed game, as appropriate.
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4. Single Layer Games
A single layer game may be modelled by a one parameter family of graphs G(r)
where r ∈ I, and I = {0, 1, 2, . . . k}. This represents a game with k + 1 rounds.
Primarily, we will make use of the matrix descriptions given by Eqs. (2) and (5).
We rewrite them as:
(6) xr+1 = Wrxr
and
(7) xr+1 = Wrxr + yr.
Ranging over the index r ∈ I gives us k + 1 matrices Wr and k + 1 vectors xr
and k + 1 vectors yr. Each graph Gr has order nr and size mr. This fixes the
dimensionality of the matrices and vectors above as nr×nr and nr×1 respectively.
Further, the matrix Wr must have mr entries. We next consider two examples of
single layer token exchange games.
4.1. PageRank. There are direct similarities between Eq. (7) and the construction
of the PageRank algorithm used by Google [5]. In the PageRank model for the
internet, webpages are the vertices of a directed graph and the (possibly multiple)
links between pages are directed edges. The main assumption being that webpages
that are more important will have more links pointing to them and, therefore, a high
probability of attracting traffic. The algorithm outputs a score for each webpage
that depends on the chance a random surfer will arrive there.
In order to adapt a simplified version of PageRank to a token based model,
suppose that links between websites are transactions and that tokens are surfers.
Each round a surfer either moves to another page or goes offline. Let G(r) where
r ∈ I be the family of graphs constructed in this way, and suppose that the graphs
Gr = (Vr, Er) have order nr and size mr. Thus, there are nr webpages and mr
links in round r. Let each webpage that exists in round r be represented by a
vertex in Vr. Suppose vi, vj ∈ Vr. Let `(vi, vj) count the number of links from
vi to vj . By design, `(vi, vi) = 0. If webpage vi has at least one link to webpage
vj and `(vi, vj) > 0, then the directed edge vivj ∈ Er. Moreover, let ki = deg(vi)
be the total number of outbound links from the website represented by vi. Set
the edge weightings ψr(vi, vj) = `(vi, vj)/ki. The initial vertex weighting may be
constructed as φ0(vi) = 1/n0. Thus, there is exactly one token and this token is
distributed equally amongst all the players.
Now, if there is no possibility of a surfer leaving, then the game is closed and
Eq. (7) may be used to iteratively calculate the PageRank. In order to allow for
surfers to enter and leave the game, suppose that a surfer leaves with probability
1− p (stays with probability p), the initial weighting is rescaled to pφ0(vi) = p/n0
and a relative vertex weighting pir(vi) = (1− p)/nr is added to each node in order
to add a fractional surfer distributed evenly across the players. Direct construction
of the vertex weighting vectors xr and yr, and the matrix Wr gives the PageRank
iteratively via Eq. (7). The factor p is commonly known as the damping factor [15].
For further details on PageRank see [15, 16, 17].
4.2. Universal Basic Incomes. Universal Basic Income systems have recently
become popular amongst academics and governments [18, 19, 20]. Consider the
simple system where a treasury issues tokens to players and issued tokens dissipate
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from players wallets back to the treasury at a fixed rate as a counter inflationary
measure. The dissipation effect ensures scarcity in the token and at the point where
the dissipation rate is equal to the issue rate there is an equilibrium. The two player
game below illustrates this idea as a token exchange game: One player represents
the ‘treasury node’ and the other player represents ‘the rest of the system’. Since
the interactions between the treasury and the rest of the system are deterministic
an explicit solution can be found for the player’s token balances.
Suppose that the players are called A and B. Each round player A gives a fixed
number of tokens f to player B. Player B return a proportion of his total tokens 
to player A each round of the game. Suppose that the game has the initial vector
x0 = (x
A
0 , x
B
0 )
T and continues for k + 1 rounds. Let f = δxA0 where 0 ≤  ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. The matrices W0, W2, . . .Wk+1 that govern the game can be obtained
from the recurrence relationship
Wj =
[
1− f/xAj 
f/xAj 1− 
]
·
The general token balances of each player are given by the recurrence equations
xAj+1 = x
A
j + x
B
j − f,
xBj+1 = (1− )xBj + f.
The token balance of player B at round j can be solved as
xBj = (1− )jxB0 + f
(
1− (1− )j

)
·
If we suppose that xB0 = 0 and x
A
0 = Ω, then the the balance for player A at round
j is given as
xAj = Ω− f ×
(
1− (1− )j

)
Of course, a more complex system will have more than two players, but this is
instructive: Player B could be considered as an open game sublayer nested within
this larger closed game. In the sublayer, players may exchange tokens amongst
themselves, but the core relationship between the treasury and the rest is captured
here.
4.3. Remarks. Single layer games provide a useful construction for understanding
payment systems and networks as discretely parametrised evolving graphs. The
direct use case for this type of language is monetary systems including cryptocur-
rencies and cryptotoken systems: These include altcoins, utility coins, security
tokens and token governance models. In the case of blockchain based ledgers each
block of transactions could be considered a round in a token exchange game with
wallet addresses representing agents or vertices. As tokens are mined the system
may be treated as open using Eq. (7) with a random ‘miner node’ receiving a token
reward per round. Alternatively, an artificial treasury node may be introduced and
the system may be considered closed with the treasury holding all the tokens that
may ever be put into circulation. In terms of empirical work, public blockchain
ledgers like Bitcoin [21] will allow the construction of historical exchange matrices
from blockchain data.
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5. Token Distributions
Using a vector to represent the tokens owned by players has an interesting proba-
bilistic interpretation: Suppose that v is a vector which represents a token allocation
amongst n players. Thus, v ∈ Rn and v = [vi] in components where i = 1, . . . , n.
The total number of tokens in circulation is given by |v| = ∑ni=1 vi. As a result we
can normalize the token allocation v and create a token distribution. Setting
(8) pi =
vi
|v|
gives the probability distribution p(i) = pi. This may be interpreted as follows: Sup-
pose that a token is drawn randomly from a bin containing |v| tokens, then pi is
the probability that it belongs to player i. A probabilistic interpretation allows for
the use of tools from various areas in statistics, including information theory [6],
for the purpose of analysing token distributions in games. We briefly introduce the
entropy and relative entropy of a token distribution as metrics.
5.1. Entropy. The Shannon entropy of a random variable X distributed according
to p(i) is defined as
(9) H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
p(i) log2 p(i).
Here, H(X) is the average measure of uncertainty in the random variable X and
computes on average the number of bits required to describe the random variable
X [6]. The entropy is bounded according to
(10) 0 ≤ H(X) ≤ log2 n
If a one player owns all the tokens, then H(X) = 0 and the answer to who owns
the token drawn from the bin is known in advance. On the other hand, if H(X) =
log2 n, then the tokens are uniformly distributed amongst the agents, i.e, pi = 1/n,
and a randomly drawn token could belong to any of the the n players with equal
probability. H(X) gives us an idea of the weighting of a distribution between these
extremes.
5.2. Relative Entropy. Another useful metric is the relative entropy which is the
measure of the distance between two distributions. Given X ∼ p(i) and X ∼ q(i).
The relative entropy is
(11) D(p||q) = p(x)
∑
i
log2
p(i)
q(i)
·
The relative entropy is useful in the following context: Suppose that at round r of a
token exchange game n players have the token distribution X ∼ q(x) and the game
ends when players attain the distribution X ∼ p(x). On average exchanges between
successive rounds reduce the relative entropy by ` bits. How many more rounds
will the game last? If k is the number of rounds required, then k = `−1D(p||q).
Further applications could be, for example, in a blockchain where a governance aim
is to modulate the entropy of the token distribution.
Information theory, is a rich subject in its own right and there are several more
useful quantities from information theory that can be developed for studying and
interpreting token distributions [6]. However, this is best left for future work.
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6. Multilayer Games
6.1. Token Portfolio Vectors. The usual arguments for price in economics are
centred around supply and demand. The seller sets a supply curve and, concomi-
tantly, the buyer sets a demand curve. At the intersection of the two curves the
‘price’ of exchange is set in terms of monetary tokens. In a token exchange game
this type of exchange rule is an agreement that takes place across multiple lay-
ers. Consider the following example: Players A and B are both in the layers
{widget,doodad}. In round r, A agrees to give a widgets to B and B agrees
to give b doodads to A. The respective exchanges happen vertically within the
layers, but the transfer of ownership appears to happen horizontally across layers:
There is a change in the ‘token portfolio’ of the players – for players that act across
several layers the experience is of having a certain number of tokens of this type,
and of that type, and so forth. The idea of a token portfolio can be formalized as
follows:
Definition 6.1. Token portfolio vector. Suppose that a player P holds (possibly
zero) token balances in a set of layers JP ⊆ J , where J is the set of potentially
available layers in round r of a multilayer game. Let |JP | = k and set JP =
{s1, s2, . . . , sk}. Player P has the token portfolio vector zrP = (Ps1 , Ps2 , . . . , Psk)
where Psi is the player’s balance in layer si.
Continuing our example, we may suppose that, initially, zrA = (a, 0) and zrB =
(0, b). Once the exchange of widgets and doodads has been recorded we have,
by construction, z(r+1)A = (0, b) and z(r+1)B = (a, 0).
6.2. Exploring Fungibility. In an economic sense, two objects are fungible if
they can be interchanged in some ratio. In the example above that ratio is a : b.
Thus, in a token exchange game that has multiple layers, a natural question is
what an exchange rate means, and how this is implemented in the model. Each
graph Grs ∈ G(r, s) is uniquely labelled. However, given two different values of
s, for example, s1 and s2 the graphs Grs1 and Grs2 may have agents (represented
by vertices) that are common. In which case, formally, if we assume that the
agents are identifiable as their vertices, Vrs1 ∩ Vrs2 6= ∅. These shared agents make
tokens in different layers fungible if there exists some prescribed ratio at which
token exchanges between agents in layer s1 are anti-correlated (exchange edges have
different directions in each layer) with token exchanges in layer s2. This motivates
the next definition.
Definition 6.2. Pairwise fungibility. A pair of token types {s1, s2} are pairwise
fungible if there is a finite rate ρs1s2 such that the exchange of a unit token in the
s1 layer induces an exchange of ρs1s2 tokens in the s2 layer. The value ρs1s2 is the
exchange or fungibility rate between the tokens, and the reciprocal rate ρs2s1 =
1
ρs1s2
.
Thus, if two ledgers are not fungible, then formally ρs1s2 = 0 and ρs2s1 = ∞ or
visa versa.
Note that this definition is an ideal and assumes that the fungibility rate holds
for at least a single round and is averaged over participating players. Individual
players may negotiate their own rates for a particular round and choice of token
types, and information on the best available rates may not always be available to
all players. There is also the possibility of trades that mix multiple token types, for
example, two apples and a glass of milk for a cookie. We ignore this possibility for
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now and focus on the pairwise relationships between layers. The reciprocity of the
fungibility rates is tantamount to the requirement that you can return something
for the same price that you bought it. Finally, the notation above is suggestive:
We may construct a fungibility matrix ρr = [ρij ]r which reflects the fungibility
rates between multiple layers in round r. We use the conventions that ρij ≥ 0,
and, by design, ρii = 1. The matrix ρ now gives us a basic tool for modelling the
meta-structure of multilayer games.
6.3. Multilayer Games. A multilayer game is a collection of single layer games
that are indexed by a parameter. Recall from Definition (3.13) that each member of
the collection is indexed by s ∈ J and, as with single layer games, there is an index
for the round of the game r ∈ I. This corresponds to the two parameter family of
graphs G(r, s) where r ∈ I an s ∈ J . We suppose that each graph Grs ∈ G(r, s)
has a vertex set Vrs and an edge set Ers. Further, |Vrs| = nrs and |Ers| = mrs. As
before, we may define weight functions on the vertices and edges which represent
balances and transaction weights respectively.
As we have discussed in this section already, in a genuine multilayer game iden-
tical players may play across layers. Suppose that P(r, s) is a collection of sets of
player labels in a multilayer game with Prs ∈ P(rs) as the set of players that are
active in round r for layer s. In a game, given Grs ∈ G(rs)), each vertex v ∈ Vrs
must belong to some player p ∈ Prs. Moreover, for layers s and s′ to be fungible
Prs ∩ Prs′ 6= ∅. This motivates the following:
Definition 6.3. Isolated layer. Suppose Grs ∈ G(r, s) and P(r, s) is the set of
player labels. If for all r ∈ I for every s′ 6= s ∈ J , we have Prs ∩ Prs′ = ∅, then s
is called an isolated layer in G.
An isolated layer is simply a layer that is not fungible with the rest of the game
because the set of players in the layer do not overlap with other layers. Trivially, a
layer may be empty of players because it is empty of tokens. The lack of a specific
resource in board-games where the bank is an external treasury is a an example:
A: Have you got any wheat?
B: No, nothing. No wheat’s been dealt yet.
The following result holds as a direct consequence of Definition (6.3).
Lemma A If s is an isolated layer, then for every choice of s′, the pair {s, s′} are
not fungible, i.e. ρss′ =∞ or 0.
Proof of Lemma A: Suppose that s is an isolated layer. Then, s shares no players
with other layers (including players with zero balances). Since there are no common
players between s and any other layer s′ exchanges in s cannot be correlated using
inter-layer player rules with exchanges in any other layer s′. Thus, if s is an isolated
layer then for each choice of s′ the pair {s, s′} has fungibility rate ρss′ =∞ or 0. 
Lemma A is the formal assertion that only players which are common to multiple
layers and have something to exchange can create and implement between layer
rules. We can put Lemma A to use by defining the following graph:
Definition 6.4. Fungibility graph family. Suppose that G(r, s) is a family of graphs
in a multilayer token exchange game. A fungibility graph is a graph Hr such that
each vertex v ∈ V (Hr) corresponds one-to-one with an s ∈ J . Thus, the vertices in
Hr are the layers in G(r, s) in a given round r. The edges of Hr are weighted and
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directed depending on the pairwise fungibility relationships between layers labelled
by s ∈ J in round r ∈ I. In particular, if layer s is not fungible with layer s′ during
round r, then there is no edge from s to s′ in Hr. Thus, the fungibility structure
of a token exchange game with graph family G(r, s) can then be modelled using the
fungibility graph family H(r).
In order to explore this concept further, consider the next example: Suppose
that G(r, s) is family of graphs in a multilayer token exchange game with a fixed
set of layers S = {s1, . . . , s`}. The layers are the vertices of each fungibility graph
Hr ∈ H(r) and we have S = V (Hr) and |V (Hr)| = `. If, in round r, every layer
s ∈ S is an isolated layer, then Hr is an empty graph with E(Hr) = ∅. On the
contrary, if all layers are pairwise fungible, then Hr has every possible edge, `
2 in
total. For a specific example, let S = {s1, s2, s3} during round r. This allows us
to construct a fungibility matrix ρr = [ρij ]r where each of ρij is the exchange ratio
between layer i and layer j. Suppose we have
(12) ρr =
1 10 ∞4 1 5
6 7 1

r
.
The diagonal entries are necessarily equal to one, since individual layers are per-
fectly fungible with themselves. Now, consider the entry ρ13 = ∞. Based on our
definitions this means that s1 cannot be swapped for s3: Players in s1 will only
accept an ‘infinite’ amount of s3 in order to give up units of s1. Next, consider the
entry ρ31. This implies that players in s3 would be willing to give up six units of
s3-tokens for each unit in s1-tokens they might receive. If this were a marketplace
conversation it would go something like:
A: I don’t want any apples for my dollars.
B: I’ll give you 6 apples for a dollar.
The presence of many market players and variability in preferences allows for this
situation to resolve itself. If no-one is willing to make this type of exchange and
player B will be forced to reduce his prices to a limit value of 0. In which case, in
round r + 1, the matrix could read
(13) ρr+1 =
 1 10 ∞4 1 5
10−3 7 1

r+1
.
On a broad scale, this the mechanisms of economics work toward establishing fun-
gibility between different ledgers. The key purpose of a token exchange game is
to make sense of this ‘informational organization’. Consider the entries ρ12 = 10
and ρ21 = 4. This implies that a players from layer s1 are willing on average to
exchange 1 unit of s1-tokens for 10 units of s2 tokens. On the other hand, players
in s2 are willing to exchange 4 units of s2-tokens for a single s1-token. Effectively,
this is the following:
A: I’ll put a dollar in your dollar account, if you put ten fish in my fish account.
B: I’ll give you four fish in your fish account for a dollar in my dollar account.
This discussion is akin to a bid-ask spread: In practice agents iteratively produce
prices that meet somewhere in the middle, so as to optimize their utility or reduce
their uncertainty. This motivates the notion of a ‘local fungibility equilibrium’
where there is a reciprocal fungibility between layer pairs and ρij = 1/ρji.
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Definition 6.5. Local fungibility equilibrium. The pair of layers {s, s′} are said to
be in a local fungibility equilibrium if and only if their fungibility rates ρss′ and ρs′s
are reciprocals: ρs′s = 1/ρss′ .
6.4. Bargaining. A grasp of fungibility in the abstract sense is not useful without
a model for how fungibility ratios are set: At some level one would like to know how
(and why) an edge in the fungibility graph from Definition (6.4) is constructed. On
the other hand, pricing is arguably an arbitrary process. We give examples of how
prices can be set by players below.
6.4.1. Auctions. Suppose that G(r, s) is a family of graphs in a multilayer game
and r ∈ I, with s ∈ J . Let P(r, s) be the family of player sets for the game. Let
x ∈ J and suppose that x is the ‘auction item’ layer. Let J∗ ⊂ J\{x} such that
for any layer s∗ ∈ J∗ and a given graphs Grs∗ and Grx for each s∗ ∈ J∗ we have
Prs∗ ∩ Prx 6= ∅. Then, J∗ is a set of ‘bid layers’ and fungibility is established as
follows:
• Immediately prior to round r players in x declare to an oracle that they
are willing to accept minimum bids βs∗ where s
∗ ∈ J∗ for a quantity of α
items in layer x.
• The oracle shares this information with players in J∗ who are allowable
bidders.
• Players in the bid layers make bids accordingly and the winning bid β∗y
where y ∈ J∗ or no bid is declared to the oracle.
• The oracle then declares that the items are fungible between layers x and
y in a ratio of α : β∗y for round r implying that ρxy = β
∗
y/α.
This type of auction is just one way of establishing the equivalence of two layers.
Another may be taking the average of various individual bids; preselecting players
depending on balances and so forth.
6.4.2. Random Ratios. Suppose that G(r, s) is a family of graphs in a multilayer
game and r ∈ I, with s ∈ J . Let P(r, s) be the family of player sets for the game.
Let x, y ∈ J . Further, suppose that Prx ∩ Pry 6= ∅ for some r. Let φrx, φry be
vertex weightings. For any r ∈ I and s ∈ J , given a player p ∈ Prs, let φrs(p) be
the total weight of all vertices belonging to player p in the graph Grs. Consider the
preselected player sets Arx ⊂ Prx and Brx ⊂ Pry and suppose that for v ∈ Arx,
φrx(v) ≥ κ, and for w ∈ Brx, φ(w) ≥ α. Next, suppose that a regulator imposes
the following fungibility condition immediately before round r.
• Each player in Arx is given a κ sided die.
• Each player in Bry is given an α sided die.
• The players roll their respective dice and the results are declared to an
independent oracle.
• The oracle uses the average of |Arx| player rolls to produce a value XA such
that 1 ≤ XA ≤ κ and, similarly, the average of |Bry| player rolls to produce
a value YB such that 1 ≤ YB ≤ α.
• The oracle declares that the layers x and y are fungible for round r at a
ratio of XA : YB so that ρxy = YB/XA and ρyx = XA/YB .
This method of setting fungibility rates simply requires a global player agreement,
a trustworthy oracle and a trusted channel so that the results of each roll may be
recorded correctly.
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6.4.3. Blind Bargaining. Here is another game with a different structure. Suppose
that we have a multilayer game with family G(r, s) and player family P(r, s) for
r ∈ I with s ∈ J . For x, y ∈ J construct the non-empty player sets Arx ⊂ Prx
and Bry ⊂ Pry such that Arx ∩ Bry = ∅. Let Tx and Ty be the total tokens in
circulation in layer x and layer y just before the start of round r. Suppose that a
fungibility rate is determined as follows:
• Each player in Arx ∪ Bry is given two numbers by an oracle, say α and β,
where 0 < α < β and where α and β are much smaller than Tx and Ty.
• The players choose either α or β and submit it to the oracle in a vote.
• The oracle determines a ratio XA : YB by counting the number of α’s and
β’s submitted by the players. The value YB is determined by the players
in Arx by majority vote, and the value XA is determined by the players
in Brx by majority vote. The oracle declares the result and the fungibility
rate is fixed for round r as ρxy = YB/XA and ρyx = XA/YB .
The resulting ratios will either be α : β, β : α or 1 : 1 thus fixing the rate ρxy as
α/β, β/α or 1.
6.5. Fungibility Graphs. In Section 6.4 several examples of the bargaining pro-
cess are developed. In this process, multiple agents collaborate across layers and
create local contracts – locally binding rules for the exchange of tokens across dif-
ferent layers of a game for a limited number of rounds. Further, various real-world
agreements including debt instruments operate in this way with a rule existing for
the duration of a contract.
The question then, is how does one consider the fungibility structure between
layers? Definition (6.4) introduces the idea of a fungibility graph: Recall that given
the family G(r, s) with r ∈ I and s ∈ J (and appropriate weightings) we can set
up a fungibility graph family H(r) that tracks the networked exchange structure
between the layers. In round r, the graph Hr ∈ H(r) has vertices drawn from the
layers s ∈ J and V (Hr) = Jr ⊆ J where Jr, is the set of layers that are active
in round r. On the other hand, the edge structure of the graph Hr requires a
locally binding contract, as well as a a weighting for that contract. For example,
if a rule exists between i, j ∈ V (Hr) such that layers i and j are fungible then
eij = ij ∈ E(Hr) and eji = ji ∈ E(Hr). Moreover, the rule specifies two weights
ρij and ρji which govern the exchange rates between the layers. Now, if the rates
are reciprocals of each other, then ρij = 1/ρji and a local fungibility equilibrium
exists. If this equilibrium exists for any pair of vertices i, j ∈ V (Hr), then the
resulting graph is no longer directed. Further, if self-edges are fixed (layers are
self-fungible in a 1:1 ratio) and we may ignore these edges, then the graph Hr is a
simple graph.
Section 6.4 illustrates that establishing contracts for exchange requires the ex-
change of information between multiple parties. A natural step forward, when
considering the fungibility graph Hr and family H(r) is a weighting of edges that
captures the information theoretic cost of establishing a contract and is measured
in bits. We suppose that there is some cost function κij associated with creat-
ing the edge ij ∈ E(Hr). We impose the restriction that fungibility (except for
self-fungibility) cannot be established locally without a contract and without the
exchange of information. In particular, if κij = 0 layers i and j are not fungible.
In a similar vein to ρr = [ρij ]r, the fungibility matrix for round r, we may also
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construct, κr = [κij ]r as a cost matrix for round r. Note that κij ≥ 0, κii = 0, and
if the graph Hr is a simple graph, then κij = κji and the matrix is symmetric. Also,
the more complex a contract, the higher the cost in terms of information exchange.
Further, these assumptions imply that the adjacency structure of Hr is unchanged
whether we consider κr or ρr.
In a similar vein, we may introduce another cost measure µij , where i, j ∈
V (Hr), for establishing the fungibility between layers i and j as a measure the
the information required to prevent an arbitrage opportunity from being created in
round r, i.e. an agent cannot create a contract in which a unit of a token in layer
x, is exchanged for tokens in layer y, which are exchanged for tokens in layer z,
which are in turn exchanged for more than one unit of tokens in layer x all in the
same round. Unlike, κij , we may have µij = 0. We may also construct the matrix
µr = [µij ] which is a weighting (measured in bits) on the graph Hr. Using these
constructions allows us to prove the following result.
Theorem B. Given a token exchange game represented by the graphs Grs ∈ G(r, s)
and a concomitant fungibility (simple) graph Hr ∈ H(r) where r ∈ I and s ∈ J . If
Hr is arbitrage minimising, then either Hr is a tree or µr = [0]r with µij = 0 for
any i, j ∈ V (Hr).
Proof of Theorem B. By assumption, Hr is a simple graph. Suppose that Hr
is arbitrage minimizing. Without loss of generality, we may assume that Hr is
connected. If Hr is a tree, then there are no cycles, and therefore no opportunities
for arbitrage in round r and so µr = [0]r. Thus, assume that Hr is not a tree.
In this case, Hr contains a cycle C. Let e = xy ∈ E(C) be an edge on C. Since
e is contained on a cycle, e is not a bridge. Thus, Hr − e is connected. Let
Σ(Hr) =
∑
e∈E(Hr) µ(e), where µ(e) is the arbitrage cost of the edge e. Since
µ(e) ≥ 0, we must have Σ(Hr − e) ≤ Σ(Hr). Removing edges from Hr until a
minimal spanning tree T is obtained gives us a tree such that V (T ) = V (Hr), and
Σ(Hr) = Σ(T ) or Σ(T ) < Σ(Hr). The latter implies a contradiction. Thus, either
Σ(Hr) = Σ(T ) or µr = [0]r, as required. 
Theorem B implies that either the ‘informational cost’ of establishing that there
are no arbitrage opportunities within a given fungibility graph is zero or the graph
Hr is a acyclic, e.g. a tree or a forest. If the informational cost of establishing that
there are no arbitrage opportunities within the structure is zero, then this could
be the effect of a global rule that affects multiple layers. For example, a system
imposed penalty that reduces arbitrage opportunities to zero (assuming that this
can be implemented effectively). On the other hand, if the graph Hr is a tree or
a forest, then Hr contains no cycles and therefore no opportunities for arbitrage.
It is, arguably, on this basis that single currency economies and monetary systems
emerge historically as opposed to barter economies.
7. Velocity Metrics
The framework above is more useful if metrics can be developed for measuring
standard economic quantities during a token exchange game. In this section, we
use algebraic methods to consider various aspects of token velocity which has often
been cited as a means to value cryptotoken based assets [22, 23].
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Figure 1. Star Graph as a Central Clearing Token
7.1. Using the Trace. Suppose that we are given our usual family of graphs
G(r, s). Recall that in a game Grs ∈ G(r, s) has the edge weighting matrix W =
[wij ]rs for the graph Grs. A straightforward metric that we can use is related to
the trace function on W . Suppose that there are nrs vertices in Grs in layer s
during round r and that each vertex in v ∈ Vrs has positive weight with φrs(v) > 0.
Setting
(14) ζrs =
tr(W )
nrs
=
∑
i wii
nrs
,
we have 0 ≤ ζrs ≤ 1. This gives us a measure of ‘circulating’ tokens in layer s
since it sums the diagonal entries via the trace: If ζrs = 0, then all tokens are
circulating and if ζrs = 1, then no tokens are circulating. A complementary metric
is ζ∗rs = 1−ζrs. The pair ζrs and ζ∗rs measure, respectively, the proportion of tokens
retained and circulated in a given round and layer.
For a global metric, recall that r ∈ I and s ∈ J and the a game evolves through
these index sets. At any point, we may interested in the level of circulation in a
particular subset of rounds and layers I∗ ⊆ I or J∗ ⊆ J . The metric ζrs may be
generalised over several values of r and s as
(15) ζ =
∑
r∈I∗
∑
s∈J∗ ζrs
|I∗||J∗| .
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By ranging over several values of r and s, we are investigating the matrixMζ = [ζrs],
where r ∈ I∗ and s ∈ J∗, and whose entries lie between zero and one. Further, Mζ
has dimensionality |I∗| · |J∗|. The complementary matrix Mζ∗ may be constructed
similarly. In most real world games, circulation volumes will be hidden, however
on publicly available blockchain data, this metric can be directly computed over
blocks (rounds) and token types (layers).
Finally, note that the assumption that each vertex has positive weight is neces-
sary to avoid skewing the metric, but can be circumvented by using the partial trace
over a subgraph of Grs: In some games token holders with a balance of zero that
reassign a zero balance to themselves need to be excluded from the computation.
This can be done using taking partial trace over those diagonal elements for vertices
v ∈ Vrs for which φrs(v) > 0 and using the subgraph Krs ⊂ Grs for which this
condition holds. The value of nrs in Eq. (14) above is replaced by |V (Krs)|. This
method still takes into account transfers of tokens to players with zero balances,
but it does not skew the metric in favour of token holding.
7.2. Inflation and Deflation. In all economies the experience of inflation is that
of increased prices. There are two sources which are commonly responsible: In-
creases in the money supply or a reduction of productivity. In the former, if the
money supply increases then, other things being equal, there are more tokens chas-
ing the same amount of production and the ratio of tokens to goods has changed.
In the latter, there are fewer goods and services, the same amount of tokens and
the ratio of goods and services to tokens changes. Thus, in order to explain infla-
tion using our framework, it will be necessary to look at the fungibility of a pair
of ledgers in tandem and consider their fungibility ratio as the supply of tokens in
each ledger is allowed to vary.
Suppose that we have a token exchange game with token type set J = {widgets,
doodads} and where the game runs over rounds I = {0, 1, . . . , k}. This induces
the family of graphs G(r, s) where r ∈ I and s ∈ J . For brevity, we may suppose
that s1 = ‘widgets’ and s2 = ‘doodads’ so J = {s1, s2}. In terms of fungibility,
we are interested in the rates at which widgets are exchanged for doodads and
visa versa. Using the language of the previous section, we may define a series of
2×2 matrices ρr where r ∈ I to describe the fungibility of the different token layers.
If the pair is uncoupled, and there is no exchange price for some round r, then
(16) ρr =
[
1 ∞
0 1
]
=
[
1 0
∞ 1
]
.
The diagonal entries are ‘self’ exchange rates, while the off diagonal entries are
exchange rates between the different ledgers. We will rule out this exceptional
case, and suppose that a finite fungibility rate can always be established between
our ledgers. Thus, we are interested in the behaviour of the matrices (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρk)
and, in particular, in the behaviour of the generic fungibility matrix
(17) ρr =
[
1 xr
1
xr
1
]
where, by convention, we set xr to be the widgets that can be bought per doodad
in round r, and so 1/xr is amount of doodads that can be bought per widget.
The next question is how the value of xr is calculated from the aggregated buyer-
seller decisions that are made across the individual layers. Suppose that widgets
are only swapped for doodads and doodads for widgets with no other drivers
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for changes in allocations other than mutual exchanges between respective token
holders. Let χrs1 be the total number of circulating widgets and suppose χrs2
is the total number of circulating doodads in round r. Let ζrs1 and ζrs2 be the
circulation metrics defined in Section (7.1) for their respective token sets. In a given
round, the following quantities give us the tokens that are unsold in their respective
ledgers:
ζrs1χrs1 and ζrs2χrs2 .
On the other hand, the values
(1− ζrs1)χrs1 and (1− ζrs2)χrs2 ,
represent that volume of tokens that are sold or exchanged in their respective
ledgers. The fungibility rate emerges from the equivalence:
(18) (1− ζrs1)χrs1 widgets ≡ (1− ζrs2)χrs2 doodads.
Dividing across gives values for xr and 1/xr in the matrix for ρr.
Since we are interested in price increases, we may work with the value of xr
directly and consider the effect of changes in relative supply and demand of tokens
in each ledger. We have
(19) xr =
(1− ζrs1)χrs1
(1− ζrs2)χrs2
·
This is obtained from Eq. (18) by dividing through so that xr widgets is equivalent
to 1 doodad. Now, it is relatively easy to track changes in price that are related to
changes in supply: If the supply of tokens in the widget layer χs1 increases, then,
all other things being equal, xr will increase. Similarly, if the value of (1 − ζrs1),
which captures the demand for doodads by widget holders would increase, the
number of widgets per doodad will also increase. Alternatively, if the supply,
(1 − ζrs1)χrs1 , would decrease and the value (1 − ζrs2)χrs2 would increase, then
xr would decrease since there are fewer widgets available per doodad. In turn,
taking the reciprocal equation and considering changes in the value of 1/xr over
successive rounds gives an indication of the availability of doodads per widget.
Note that the extreme cases in which there is no supply or no demand yield xr =∞
or xr = 0 as required by previous discussions on fungibility.
7.3. Token Velocity. Most discussions around token velocity in the blockchain
community [22, 23] center around the equation of exchange in monetary economics
which says that for a given period:
(20) M × V = P ×Q,
where M is the nominal money supply, V is the velocity of money, P is the price
level and Q is an index of ‘real’ expenditures. The underlying premise is that, other
things being equal, changes in the money supply has an impact on nominal price
levels. In order to adapt this to a token exchange game, consider Eq. (19): Set
P = xr and M = χrs1 with V = (1 − ζrs1 ) and Q = (1 − ζrs2)χrs2 . So, Eq. (19)
is the equation of exchange over a single round, and, further, it is invertible in
the sense that it can be constructed from the widget or the doodad perspective.
In principle, an equivalent equation for multiple rounds can be constructed using
averages.
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8. Examples
The most direct and interesting applications for the language developed thus far
is in the area of cryptotokens and blockchain related products. The spectacular
variety of cryptotoken products and the lack of clarity in terms of their behaviour
makes a framework for studying their properties extremely valuable. In this section
we apply the models developed above to study the Lightning Network [7] and the
Circles cryptotoken system [8].
8.1. The Lightning Network. The Lightning Network is a proposed upgrade to
the original Bitcoin network that allows for scalability [7]. The idea is to create
side chains that allow users to transact amongst themselves without necessarily
recording all of their transactions to the main blockchain. The process works as
follows: Two users (or more) within an existing ledger create multi-party channel
and commit some of the their existing tokens to this channel. The value of the
channel in the original ledger is the sum of the committed tokens. The channel
then becomes a separate ledger and users within this ledger can then continue
exchanging tokens without needing to load the main ledger with the record of these
exchanges. Once the users are done with these side exchanges they exit the channel
and final balances are uploaded to the main blockchain (the original ledger) and
the channel is destroyed.
In order to capture this as a token exchange game, suppose that we have a family
of graphs G(r) which represents a single layer token exchange game - the original
ledger. Further, let the total number of nodes in round r be nr and, without loss
of generality, assume that the token supply is fixed at TG .
Suppose that in round r a total of mr < nr users wish to use the lightning
network in order to transact. In order to do this a new ledger with mr nodes needs
to be created and a node is added to the Gr network so that |V (Gr+1)| = nr + 1.
The sum of the committed tokens is the balance reflected in Gr+1 for the new node.
The total number of tokens TG remains unchanged.
A sublayer is created as a new game corresponding to this additional node and
each of the mr users owns their committed tokens in the sublayer. Suppose that
the sublayer corresponds to a family of graphs F(j) where j indexes the rounds in
the new layer. In any given round a vector fj tracks the ownership of tokens in
the layer. The initial token distribution vector in this layer f0 assigns the tokens
committed in round r of G(r) to agents in round j = 0 of the new layer. Now the
sublayer is out of sync with the original one and transactions take place in the sub
layer. The total number of tokens in the sublayer are TF ≤ TG . Suppose that for
the moment TF is fixed and the game is closed (the open case is relatively easy
to handle). Depending on the rules of the sublayer various matrices will track the
exchanges in the layer and we may suppose that the relationship for a collection of
(possibly stochastic) matrices Wj .
(21) fj+1 = Wjfj
We may suppose that the sublayer exists only for a finite number of rounds j ∈
{0, 1, . . . , k} and the final distribution
(22) fk = Wk−1Wk . . .W1f0
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Figure 2. The Lightning Network as a Token Exchange Game
is uploaded to the original layer by adding the vector fk (with zero filling for non-
participants in the sublayer) to the distribution vector in round Gr+2 of the main
layer. The sublayer place holding node is then deleted from the layer.
The main idea here is nestedness and the operation of creating a sublayer from
an existing layer. Rounds can occur within the sublayer with a distribution update
to the main layer happening only later. The token supply to the sublayer can be
varied as new funds are committed to the ‘parent’ node in the main layer, and
the dimensionality of the sublayer can be varied as new members join the family
F(r, s) from the main layer. As long as mr  nr this can be an efficient process.
A detailed schematic is presented in Figure 2.
8.2. Circles. Circles is a proposed blockchain based Universal Basic Income system
[8]. The idea is centred around personalized currencies and economic trust invested
into each personal currency is due to underlying social trust. Every user is issued
their own unique personal coin, and the system issues personal coins at a rate
defined by an issuance algorithm. All coins are fungible at a fixed 1:1 ratio, but the
question of whether someone will accept your coins and exchange them depends
on social trust: The user is incentivized to hold tokens that are ‘trusted’ by the
underlying social trust network, and to establish trust into their own personal token.
The value of a given token correlates to a users social credibility.
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As a general adaptation of circles into a token exchange game suppose that there
are Nr users in the circles community in a given round r and so N0 unique tokens
at round r = 0. This implies a multilayer game with Nr layers in round r. Layers
can be open or closed depending on whether there is an internal treasury (an extra
player that acts as a coin repository) or an external treasury that issues the coins to
the layers. In the following, we suppose that the game is open, and the tokens are
issued from an external source. Then, the game operates according to the following
rule set:
• Issue a token to each layer in each round to the player that owns the layer
from an external treasury.
• Tokens are fungible between layers i and j during round r in a fixed 1:1
ratio if token holders in layer i trust token holders in layer j based on
an underlying social trust graph between all round r players. Here, trust
means that players are willing to exchange their respective personal coins
for another’s personal coins.
• No exchanges happen in round r = 0.
Recall that there are Nr players in total in round r. In the network picture, this
game induces the family of graphs G(r, s) where r ∈ I and s ∈ J , and I and J are
index sets. Further, |J | ≥ Nr since there will be Nr unique circles tokens each with
their own layer. Since there are Nr players altogether, each graph Grs ∈ G(r, s) has
|V (Grs)| ≤ Nr. The decision about whose circles tokens to hold and when resides
with the player and affects |V (Grs)|. For example, if in round r every player decides
to hold tokens Alice’s layer a ∈ J , then |V (Gra)| = Nr. On the other hand, if no-
one except Bob trusts tokens from Bob’s layer b ∈ J in round r, then |V (Grb)| = 1.
Thus, the graph structure, vertex weightings and edge weightings will depend on
the fungibility structure between the layers.
Suppose that H(r) is the family of fungibility graphs corresponding to G(r, s).
We may suppose that H0 is given based on some initial player relationships. In any
given round |V (Hr)| = Nr. We are interested in developing a model for how Hr
evolves for a general r. As the fungibility ratio is already fixed, we may simplify by
ignoring the edge-weightings (fungibility rates) and focus solely on edge existence.
A useful starting point is the model for preferential attachment in random graphs
which is developed in the article by Baraba´si and Albert [24] and has been used
extensively to model social networks. The model works as follows: Given H0 as an
initial connected seed graph, we suppose that new nodes are added to the network
at a rate of one per round. Each new node is connected to nr ≤ Nr existing nodes
with a probability that depends on the degree of an existing node, i.e. people who
know more people are more likely to know new people who join the network. The
probability p(vi) that a new node is connected to given node vi ∈ V (Hr) is given
by
(23) p(vi) =
δ(vi)∑
j δ(vj)
where δ(vi) is the degree of vertex i. The effect is that after r + 1 rounds, the
magnitude of the vertex set is |V (Hr+1)| = |V (H1)| + r = n¯, and the degree
distribution – the fraction of nodes of degree k is given by a polynomial P (k) ∼ k−3.
This gives an insight into the underlying trust structure as the network evolves.
Further details on random graphs may be found in [12].
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Figure 3. A Circles Game
As a second point of analysis, given a circles game, we may also consider the
construction of a bipartite simple graph which maps out who owns which tokens.
Suppose again that we have nr players that are circles token holders in round r.
This motivates the construction of a bipartite graph Fr. Partition the graph into
sets X and Y such that V (Fr) = Xr ∪ Yr. Let Xr be the set of players, and Yr
be the set of tokens in round r. We construct the edge set as follows: For vertices
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y the edge e = xy ∈ E(Fr) if and only if player y is a holder of
token x. We can weight the edges using the player’s current balance of a particular
tokens to deepen the analysis. This ties up with the idea of a token portfolio vector
from Definition 6.1. In this case, the sum of the edge-weights of a vertex x ∈ X is
the total number of circles tokens owned by player x, while the sum of the edge-
weights of a vertex y ∈ Y is the total number of circles tokens of type-y that have
been issued.
Consider the following example which has been adapted from [8]: The game
in Figure 8.2 has been going on for 9 rounds. Every minute a new personal coin
issued. Eve (red) started the game at round 0, Diana (gray) joined in round 2, while
Alice (blue), Bob (purple) and Charlie (green) joined in round 4. Alice has three
evecoins and one bobcoin as well as five alicecoins. In this representation,
using the properties of random bipartite graphs such as degree, average degree,
connectedness, and the plethora of other graph invariants [3, 4, 12, 13] we may
deepen our understanding of the game as it evolves.
9. Conclusion
Token systems, at their heart, are systems in which records are exchanged
amongst agents. The core result of this paper has been to develop a language
for modelling these types of exchanges using networks and linear algebra. This
provides a basis for understanding real world token systems including monetary
and blockchain based token systems and their properties as mathematical entities
through various metrics. This abstract understanding, in turn, has implications for
the design, construction and analysis of token systems in the real-world.
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